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Abstract
This study investigates whether there is a relation between how motion is linguistically 
expressed and how it is conceptualised. To do this, native speakers of two languages that 
differ typologically in how they encode telic motion (English and Spanish) are compared 
in both a verbal and a non-verbal experiment. The preferred non-verbal methods to test the 
linguistic relativity hypothesis in this domain have so far been recognition memory and 
binary judgments. This study questions the experimental validity of these approaches and 
implements an alternative method which combines similarity ratings with a verbal interfer-
ence manipulation. The results reported here constitute evidence against linguistic relativ-
ity and in support of cognitive universalism.
Keywords Linguistic relativity · Whorf · Motion cognition · Path · Manner · Similarity 
ratings · Verbal interference · English · Spanish
Introduction
Classical theories of cognition generally take humans’ conceptual structure to be universal, 
that is, invariant across languages and cultures. This position is represented by the work of, 
among others, Fodor (1975), Jackendoff (1983, 1990), Gleitman and Papafragou (2005) 
and Pinker (1994, 2007). Over the last three decades, a group of psychologists, linguists 
and anthropologists, chief among whom are Lucy (1992a, b, 1996, 2010), Levinson (1996, 
1997, 2003) and colleagues (e.g. Gumperz and Levinson 1996; Bowerman and Levinson 
2001), and Boroditsky (2001, 2011) and colleagues (Winawer et al. 2007; Casasanto and 
Boroditsky 2008; Fuhrman et al. 2011; Boroditsky et al. 2011; Thibodeau and Boroditsky 
2013), have revived interest in  an alternative view, known as the linguistic relativity (or 
Sapir-Whorf) hypothesis. Though by no means a monolithic group, these researchers share 
the belief that, to paraphrase Lucy (1992b: 3), ‘there may be some identifiable cognitive 
correlates (outside of the specifically linguistic realm) associated with using a particular 
language’. This position is supported by a significant number of studies which suggest that, 
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at least in some domains, language-specific categories may indeed exert an influence on 
thought.
Testing the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis
Linguistic relativity research begins with the following question: to the extent that lan-
guages differ, is it the case that speakers of different languages have different thoughts 
about reality? This question is difficult to answer, and multiple factors may be responsible. 
First, ‘thought’ is not a singular cognitive phenomenon and comprises an array of infor-
mational processes; thus, in the same way as ‘reality’ or ‘the universe’, ‘thought’ is too 
vague a category and needs to be refined conceptually before being subjected to scien-
tific scrutiny. Second, although languages differ in many significant ways, there is no obvi-
ous reason to decide a priori which of these differences may bear an influence on thought. 
More complexity is added by the fact that language and thought are rarely experienced 
as separate phenomena, which makes it difficult to treat them experimentally as different 
variables.
In spite of these difficulties, researchers have tried to shed light on this issue by inves-
tigating whether differences in non-verbal behaviour are causally related to language-spe-
cific differences. The rationale of this approach could be summarised as follows: assuming 
that behaviour is a reflection of a reasoning or thinking process, and if it is true that cer-
tain lexico-grammatical features can have an influence on thought, speakers of two differ-
ent languages which happen to encode one domain of experience in a markedly different 
way from one another may also behave differently when tested in that particular domain in 
a non-verbal task.
Many researchers who adopted this modus operandi have claimed to find positive evi-
dence for linguistic relativity. For example, in a series of studies concerned with gram-
matical influence on non-verbal behaviour, Lucy (1992a; Lucy and Gaskins 2001, 2003) 
has shown that speakers of non-plural marking classifier languages (e.g. Yucatec) are more 
likely to base their similarity judgements of objects on substance properties than speakers 
of languages with obligatory grammatical number marking and count-mass noun distinc-
tion (e.g. English), who tend to base their judgments on shape. In the domain of colour, 
Winawer et al. (2007) tested English and Russian speakers, and found that an obligatory 
colour distinction in Russian between siniy (‘dark blue’) and goluboy (‘light blue’) led to 
differences in colour discrimination, i.e.: Russian speakers were faster to discriminate two 
colours when they belonged to different linguistic categories in Russian (one to siniy and 
the other to goluboy) than when they fell under the same linguistic category. Spatial and 
object cognition has been another area of active research. Levinson (1994, 1996, 1997) 
and Haun et al. (2011), for instance, found that speakers whose respective languages differ 
in how they represent spatial location behave differently when asked to reproduce certain 
arrays of objects non-verbally; more recently, Koster and Cadierno (2018) found that Ger-
man speakers have better recognition memory for object position than Spanish speakers.1
It is unclear, however, whether these studies can be taken as evidence for linguistic rela-
tivity. To explain why this is the case, it first needs to be made clear what counts (and what 
does not count) as evidence for this hypothesis. The core belief behind relativity is that the 
1 See Thierry (2016) for experimental work that approaches the linguistic relativity question from a neuro-
functional perspective.
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habitual use of language can have enduring effects on cognition; Levinson (2003: 291), 
for example, maintains that ‘[…] the need to output language coded in specific semantic 
parameters can force a deep-seated specialization of mind’. According to this view (see 
also Lucy 1992a, 1992b; Boroditsky 2001; Majid et al. 2004; Haun et al. 2011), the habit-
ual use of language has the capacity to induce a given mode of mental processing, which 
may persist even in circumstances in which language is not being used. This is why evi-
dence for linguistic relativity is often discussed in the literature in terms of ‘outside speech 
time’ (Cardini 2010) or ‘after language’ (Wolff and Holmes 2011) effects.
Given this, linguistic relativity researchers have been generally concerned, as Dan 
Slobin points out, ‘with the search for influences of particular languages on non-linguistic 
condition in situations in which language is not being used, overtly or covertly’ (Slobin 
2003: 157, his emphasis). Though most of the data presented in support of linguistic rela-
tivity have been obtained in non-verbal tasks (e.g. similarity judgments and memory rec-
ognition), it is actually plausible that participants, when engaged in these experiments, 
could have made use of internal verbal descriptions of the target to solve the task given (for 
example, in the domain of colour, using colour names to guide choices). This evidence, 
therefore, should be approached with caution. Opponents of relativity, in fact, typically dis-
miss the results obtained in behavioural experiments, arguing that language is likely to 
have covertly mediated participants’ performance and, therefore, contaminated what was 
supposed to be a non-verbal task (e.g. Pinker 1994; Papafragou et al. 2002).
It should be noted that Slobin (1996a) has hypothesised about one type of linguistic 
effect on cognition known as ‘thinking for speaking’, which is distinct from and less contro-
versial than linguistic relativity (cf. Levelt 1989; Pinker 1994); this effect, however, is often 
referred to in the literature as a ‘weak’ form of relativity (e.g. Han and Cadierno 2010; Car-
dini 2010; Filipović 2011). This can be confusing because, from a theoretical viewpoint, 
‘thinking for speaking’ is not a Whorfian effect but rather a phenomenon believed to occur 
at the thought/language interface. Indeed, ‘thinking for speaking’ effects are hypothesised 
to arise under very specific conditions, that is, prior to the moment of speaking, when 
thoughts are believed to structure themselves according to the structure of the language to 
be spoken. Thus, ‘thinking for speaking’, for which there is some experimental evidence 
(e.g. von Stutterheim and Nüse 2003; Papafragou et al. 2008), is a transient phenomenon; 
that is, unlike linguistic relativity, it is not hypothesised to extend beyond speech time.
The Conceptualisation of Motion Events
Over the past 15  years much linguistic relativity research has been devoted to studying 
the relationship between how motion events are expressed cross-linguistically and how 
they are conceptualised across speakers of different languages. This type of research draws 
mainly on Talmy’s (1985) typological work on motion events, which divided the languages 
of the world into two groups according to how motion events are lexicalised. In what fol-
lows, I will review the relevant typological work done on motion lexicalisation, as well as 
the attempts made to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis in this domain.
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The Typology of Motion Expressions: The Case of English Versus Spanish
Motion is a dynamic domain of experience which involves the movement of an entity 
through space. According to Talmy (2000: 25–27), ‘motion’ is composed of four basic 
semantic components: a Figure (or the moving entity), a Ground (or spatial reference), 
the fact of Motion and the Path or trajectory followed by the moving Figure. In addition to 
these basic components, information relating to the Manner of displacement (e.g. walking, 
running) is commonly lexicalised too.
Talmy (1985) proposed to divide the world languages into two groups on the basis 
of how languages encode the semantic components of the motion event. In the so-called 
‘satellite-framed’ languages (or S-languages), Path information tends to be expressed in a 
‘satellite’ or verb particle attached to the clause’s main verb whereas Manner information 
is encoded in the main verb. Typical S-languages include most Indo-European languages 
as well as Finno-Ugric (e.g. Finish, Hungarian) and Sino-Tibetan (e.g. Mandarin Chinese) 
languages (Talmy 1991). The following English sentence illustrates how S-languages typi-
cally encode a motion event:2 
(1) Boris [F] walked [Mo + Ma] across [P] Trafalgar Square [G]
In ‘verb-framed’ languages (or V-languages), by contrast, Path information is usually 
expressed in the main verb of the clause whereas Manner information is either expressed at 
the end of that clause in the form of an adjunct complement or omitted altogether. V-lan-
guages include Romance (e.g. Spanish, Italian, French), Semitic (e.g. Hebrew, Moroccan 
Arabic) and Turkic languages, among others (Talmy 1991). The following Spanish sen-
tence illustrates how V-languages typically encode a motion event:
(2) Boris [F] cruzó [Mo + P] Trafalgar Square [G] caminando [Mo + Ma] (optional) (Spanish)
  ‘Boris crossed Trafalagar Square walking’
Because the expression of Manner information is optional in V-languages, speakers of 
V-languages like Spanish tend to indicate Manner only when it is contextually relevant 
(Slobin 1996a, b). By contrast, speakers of S-languages like English tend to lexicalise both 
Manner and Path of motion information with equal frequency, the reason for this being 
that S-languages typically require these two semantic components of motion to be realised 
morphosyntactically.
Talmy’s (1985) generalisation, it must be noted, has been challenged by subsequent 
research; as Aske (1989) observed, in the case of English versus Spanish (and, in fact, 
in the case of English vs. all Romance languages as well as Greek), Talmy’s proposed 
typology must be circumscribed to telic motion expressions, namely, lexicalisations of 
actions involving a change of location (also known as ‘bounded’ motion events; cf. Vendler 
1967). Indeed, when the motion event lexicalised is an atelic one, no typological contrast 
between English and Spanish is observed; for instance:
(3) Boris [F] walked [Mo + Ma] around [P] the lake [G] (English)
 
2 F = Figure; G = Ground; Ma = Manner; Mo = Motion; P = Path.
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(4) Boris [F] caminó [Mo + Ma] alrededor [P] del lago [G] (Spanish)
  ‘Boris walked around (of) the lake’
In Example 3, the Path-phrase around the lake does not predicate a change of location 
because neither the initial nor the final state of the moving Figure is indicated. In other 
words, the event is ‘unbounded’ (i.e. Boris could have walked around the lake in perpetu-
ity). In these cases, Spanish does not differ from English in how the motion event is lexi-
calised, as illustrated by Example 4. By contrast, Spanish and English do exhibit a typo-
logical contrast when the motion event being expressed is bounded; this is because Spanish 
telic events are constructed by using Path verbs such as entrar ‘enter’, cruzar ‘cross’ or 
subir ‘ascend’, and not by attaching a prepositional Path phrase to a Manner verb. This 
explains why in Examples 1 and 2 Spanish and English differ in how they lexicalise motion 
but no difference arises in Examples 3 and 4.
To sum up, English and Spanish differ in how telic motion expressions are encoded: 
whereas Spanish uses change-of-location verbs to express Path and confines Manner infor-
mation to an optional adjunct complement, English shows a strong tendency to encode 
both components: i.e., Manner in the main verb and Path in a satellite or verb particle. It is 
important to note, however, that both languages are able to use both lexicalisation patterns, 
although each language is typically associated with one of them. In fact, English has many 
verbs which encode Path information (e.g. exit, enter, ascend, descend, cross, turn). How-
ever, in the domain of telic motion, the preferred lexicalisation pattern of English is differ-
ent from the preferred lexicalisation pattern of Spanish. This has been confirmed by sev-
eral studies, including Gennari et al. (2002), Slobin (1996a, b) and Ozcaliskan and Slobin 
(1999).
Linguistic Relativity in the Motion Domain
The fact that languages differ in the way they encode different domains of experience does 
not entail that speakers of different languages conceptualise these domains differently. To 
explore whether speakers of V- and S-languages conceptualise bounded motion events dif-
ferently from one another, non-verbal experiments need to be conducted.
Two main methods have been used to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis in the 
domain of Manner and Path of motion, both of them involving triads of pictures or video-
clips (i.e. a target and two alternates). One method relies on similarity judgments, which 
require participants to make a binary choice between two alternates by selecting the one 
which is perceived as being closer in resemblance to the target. A triad typically presents 
[Manner α + Path α] in the target, [Manner β + Path α] in the same-Path alternate and 
[Manner α + Path β] in the same-Manner alternate. Because Manner is hypothesised to be 
less cognitively salient for V-language (e.g. Spanish) speakers  than for S-language (e.g. 
English) speakers, the task-specific prediction is that, on average, the former should prefer 
alternates which display the same Path as the given target, rather than alternates with the 
same Manner.
Studies using similarity judgments have produced conflicting results; the bulk of the 
evidence, however, supports the view that linguistic and conceptual representations are not 
causally related. Negative evidence for linguistic relativity in the domain of Manner and 
Path of motion was found in Bohnemeyer et al. (2001, 2004), Gennari et al. (2002), Papa-
fragou et al. (2002), Pourcel (2005: ch6), Cardini (2010), Papafragou and Selimis (2010; 
Experiments 2 and 3). Positive evidence, in turn, was found in Finkbeiner et  al. (2002), 
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Hohenstein (2005), Papafragou and Selimis (2010; Experiment 1), Czechowska and Ewert 
(2011), as well as in Kersten et al. (2010), which did not employ similarity judgments but a 
combination of object-sorting and event-sorting tasks.
The other method used to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis in this domain is rec-
ognition memory. This task is typically conducted in two sessions. The first part of the 
experiment requires participants to watch a series of target clips which are played one at a 
time. In the second part, participants are shown, in a random order, the clips viewed in the 
first session along with their alternates, and are asked to select only those clips which were 
shown to them during the first session. The task-specific prediction here is that V-language 
(e.g. Spanish) speakers would make more errors than S-language (e.g. English) speakers 
with alternates that have the same Path as the target but that vary in Manner. Negative evi-
dence from memory recognition was found in Gennari et al. (2002) and Papafragou et al. 
(2002) whereas positive evidence was, to our knowledge, only reported in Filipović (2011).
Similarity judgments and memory recognition require participants to assess the degree 
to which a controlled set of stimuli have common or distinctive properties. The studies 
reviewed above, in this sense, provide direct evidence about the relative salience of Manner 
versus Path in participants’ conceptualisations of bounded motion events (Gennari et  al. 
2002). A different way to approach the linguistic relativity hypothesis in this domain is 
to ask whether differences in motion event encoding are related to differences in attention 
allocation or event inspection. This question has been investigated by Trueswell and Papa-
fragou (2010), who monitored English and Greek native speakers’ eye movements as they 
inspected animated motion events in preparation for a subsequent recognition task; nega-
tive evidence for linguistic relativity was reported, as well as evidence that language affects 
event inspection when participants use language covertly during event encoding.
A study like Trueswell and Papafragou (2010) strongly suggests that language does not 
have an enduring effect on how humans inspect motion events, but it is unable to reveal 
whether there are any language-specific differences in how these events are conceptualised. 
Though perceptual and conceptual structure are largely inter-dependant, not all aspects 
of conceptual structure can be read off at the level of perceptual structure (cf. Jackendoff 
1983, Smith and Heise 1992). Thus, to test whether English and Spanish speakers concep-
tualise bounded motion events differently, decision-based tasks must be implemented.
The Study in Context: Previous Shortcomings and a New Direction
As is clear from the previous section, the experimental efforts aimed at investigating 
whether speakers of V- and S-languages conceptualise bounded motion events differently 
have produced conflicting results. In this section, I will explore some of the reasons why 
this might be so. In addition, I will question the evidence obtained in similarity judgment 
and memory recognition tasks (both negative and positive) and will propose a better suited 
method to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis in the motion domain.
When is a Non‑verbal Task Non‑verbal?
A non-verbal task is a language-free experiment, in which participants are engaged 
in activities which do not involve the production or comprehension of language (e.g. 
visual perception, categorisation, memory recognition). However, getting  an experi-
ment to be actually  non-verbal is not a  straightforward  matter; the main issue is  that 
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participants often make use of covert language in order to make sense of   the stimuli 
presented to them (cf. Papafragou et al. 2002; Boroditsky et al. 2003). As this is a rela-
tively common phenomenon, it becomes difficult to determine, when significant cross-
group differences are found, whether these differences are evidence for linguistic rela-
tivity or whether they simply corroborate the established fact that linguistic labels, when 
generated during a given task, can influence participant’s performance (e.g. Carmichael 
et al. 1932; Bower et al. 1975; Gennari et al. 2002).
The absence of mechanisms to experimentally distinguish linguistic relativity effects 
(which are hypothesised to persist in situations in which language is neither being used 
overtly nor covertly) from transient effects of language on non-verbal cognition has 
made it difficult for researchers to infer definite conclusions from the evidence available. 
Hohenstein (2005: 420), for instance, reports a language-specific effect on non-verbal 
performance; however, towards the end of her study, she acknowledges that this result 
may be due to participants using language covertly during the task:
Another possible explanation of why English and Spanish speakers appear differ-
ent from each other in the nonlinguistic task is that they are using a verbal encod-
ing of the events to process similarities in the scenes. In other words, participants 
could be saying to themselves “he’s marching out the gate” while they watch a 
video. They could then be using this information, and the saliency of the verb in 
particular, to choose the matching alternate video, rendering the task linguistic. 
Indeed, in this study the children were not prevented from verbally encoding the 
video materials while watching the stimuli.
In the domain of Manner and Path of motion, in fact, all of the studies which 
have claimed to find linguistic relativity effects have also acknowledged—except for 
Czechowska and Ewert (2011)—that these effects could be the consequence of partici-
pants engaging in inner speech during the task (cf. Finkbeiner et al. 2002: 456; Filipović 
2011: 482; Kersten et  al. 2010: 649). Following Gennari et  al. (2002), I will refer to 
these transient effects of language on non-verbal behaviour, which are observed to occur 
only when experience is linguistically mediated, as ‘language-as-strategy’ effects.
I believe that evidence for linguistic relativity can be obtained only by using a dual-
task paradigm, namely, a standard non-verbal task plus a shadowing or verbal interfer-
ence task (e.g. counting aloud, repeating pseudo words, etc.). The rationale behind this 
belief is as follows: linguistic relativity effects are hypothesised to be deep-seated cog-
nitive biases acquired through the habitual use of language and, in this regard, should 
be impervious to a verbal interference manipulation; by contrast, language-as-strategy 
effects, since they are the direct consequence of participants using language covertly 
during a behavioural task should disappear under verbal interference.
Of all the studies conducted so far aimed at exploring whether the conceptualisa-
tion of Path and Manner of motion follows language-congruent patterns (see “Linguistic 
Relativity in the Motion Domain” section), only two have used a dual-task paradigm, 
namely Gennari et  al. (2002; ‘Shadow’ condition) and Cardini (2010). These studies 
found that Spanish and Italian speakers supply Manner information less frequently than 
English speakers when talking about bounded motion events. In addition, Gennari et al. 
(2002; ‘Naming First’ condition) found that when participants are asked to perform 
similarity judgements for motion events immediately after having described the events, 
the linguistic labelling affected their choices. However, under verbal interference condi-
tions, neither Gennari et al. (2002) nor Cardini (2010) found language-specific effects 
on performance.
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This is consistent with a growing number of studies showing that when participants 
are placed under conditions of verbal interference, cross-group differences disappear. For 
example, Winawer et  al. (2007) found that when English- and Russian-speaking partici-
pants were engaged in a shadowing task, language-specific effects on colour discrimina-
tion did not arise (see also Roberson and Davidoff 2000; Pilling et al. 2003; Wiggett and 
Davies 2008). More recently, Athanasopoulos and Bylund (2013) found that differences in 
grammatical aspect encoding between English and Swedish had an effect on participants’ 
encoding of motion endpoints in memory; this difference, however, was shown to be neu-
tralised under verbal interference conditions. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
cross-group differences reported in non-verbal studies such as Finkbeiner et al. (2002) and 
Hohenstein (2005) are most likely to be evidence for the language-as-strategy account.3
A potential problem associated with using a dual-task paradigm needs to be considered, 
however. A verbal interference task typically involves participants repeating numbers or 
nonsense words without interruption during a non-verbal task; what this appears to do is 
to saturate the language faculty and, as a result, prevent participants from solving the task 
with the aid of covert language. If it could be shown that the verbal interference task sup-
presses only the language faculty whereas all the other cognitive functions needed to solve 
the non-verbal experiment remain unaffected by it, then one could safely conclude that a 
dual-task design is a ‘clean’ method, in the sense that it enables researchers to control for 
one specific factor, that is, the recruitment of linguistic codes during task performance, and 
to study how the cognitive system behaves when this factor is taken out of the experimental 
equation.
It is not clear, however, that a verbal interference manipulation affects participants only 
by preventing them from recruiting linguistic codes during task performance. For example, 
research indicates that the cognitive impairments associated with using a mobile phone 
(either handheld or hands-free) while driving can be as profound as those associated with 
driving while drunk (Langer et al. 2005; Strayer et al. 2006). Therefore, if linguistic rela-
tivity effects are not observed under verbal interference conditions, two interpretations are 
possible. The first is that these effects simply do not exist; once participants are prevented 
from relying on internal language during the task, cross-group behavioural differences are 
no longer observed. The other option is that, because the dual-task paradigm imposes a 
high processing load on the cognitive system, the evidence for linguistic relativity is swept 
away; according to this interpretation,  cross-group differences disappear not  because 
linguistic codes are prevented from being recruited, but due to the fact that the normal 
functioning of the system is impaired. The results obtained in the present study, as will be 
discussed in “Results and Discussion” section, provide evidence  in favour of the  former 
interpretation.
3 Some researchers who use the term ‘linguistic relativity’ as a general label to refer to all possible ways 
in which language can affect non-verbal representations and processes maintain, naturally, that what I refer 
to as ‘language-as-strategy’ effects constitute evidence for linguistic relativity (cf. Lucy 2014: 28). If tran-
sient effects of language on cognition count as evidence for linguistic relativity, then relativity is an estab-
lished fact which, it is worth noting, is not necessarily incompatible with the universalist thesis presented in 
“Introduction”. What is controversial is whether language can have detectable effects on non-verbal behav-
iour in situations in which language is neither being used overtly nor covertly (cf. Slobin 2003).
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Choosing the Type of Task
As discussed in “Linguistic Relativity in the Motion Domain” section, two methods have 
traditionally been used to test the existence of linguistic relativity effects in the domain 
of Manner and Path of motion: i.e. recognition memory tasks and similarity judgments. 
In what follows, I will discuss some of the problems associated with these two methods 
and explain why they cannot be fully trusted, even if combined with a verbal interference 
manipulation.
Recognition Memory Tasks (or Blind Testing)
Recognition memory, because it is believed to be a window into the mind’s non-linguistic 
realm, has been embraced by many as a valid experimental method for testing the linguistic 
relativity hypothesis in the domain of motion (e.g. Gennari et al. 2002; Papafragou et al. 
2002; Filipović 2011). However, this method is not without problems. This type of task, in 
order to be empirically informative, needs to generate a sufficient number of errors. This 
means that, on the one hand, it cannot be too easy; were this the case, the number of errors 
would just be too low and the task therefore uninformative. On the other hand, the task 
cannot be too difficult; were this the case, participants –regardless of the linguistic group 
they may belong to– would inevitably produce an extremely high (and similar) number of 
errors, thus preventing language group effects from surfacing (assuming that these effects 
exist).
Determining the adequate degree of difficulty for the memory task is not a straightfor-
ward business, however; many factors can have an impact on a task’s perceived difficulty, 
including the number of experimental items used and the duration of the distracting activ-
ity between the viewing of the targets and the viewing of the targets and alternates together. 
As Cardini (2010: 1447) notes, it is very hard (if possible at all) to know in advance what 
the most adequate values for each of these variables are. Given this, it is not surprising that 
studies have failed to find an effect of language on memory for Path and Manner of motion 
even in circumstances in which participants were asked to describe the target events (and 
thus perform linguistic encoding overtly) prior to the memory task (cf. Gennari et al. 2002; 
Papafragou et al. 2002).4
Similarity Judgment Tasks (Testing Determinism?)
Similarity judgments involve participants facing a binary choice: after being presented 
with a target clip displaying a motion event, they need to decide which of the two alternate 
clips (one in which Manner varies while Path remains the same and the other in which Path 
varies but Manner does not) is more similar to the target clip. The problem with this task 
is that it relies on the assumption that Path and Manner salience are evenly distributed in 
cognition; in other words, that participants, unless they have a language-specific cognitive 
bias, should not exhibit a differential degree of cognitive salience for either Path or Man-
ner. If this assumption was correct and linguistic relativity effects existed, the task should 
4 The exception to the rule is Filipović’s (2011) study, which did find an effect of language group on mem-
ory for Path and Manner. This study, however, did not use a verbal interference manipulation and, there-
fore, it is uncertain whether it can be taken to be evidence for relativity, something which Filipović herself 
acknowledges (2011: 482).
10 Journal of Psycholinguistic Research (2020) 49:1–29
1 3
technically work: speakers of S-languages (e.g. English) would choose the same-Path (or 
different-Manner) alternate in approximately 50% of the triads, whereas speakers of V-lan-
guages (e.g. Spanish) will make it their preferred choice. This assumption is not supported 
by the evidence available, however.
For example, the results obtained in Gennari et al. (2002) and Cardini (2010) show that 
participants, regardless of their linguistic background, have a preference for same-Path 
alternates, which suggests that Path is more cognitively salient than Manner. This is not 
at all surprising; ‘directionality in human motion’, as Pourcel (2004: 510) notes, ‘may be 
understood to represent the very goal of motion—at least in typical cases. Such a possibil-
ity would mean that the Path dimension overrides the Manner dimension in the cognitive 
appreciation of human motion as a general rule’. Pourcel’s observation is in accord with 
the proposed universal bias to prioritise Goal over Source information in motion events; 
see Lakusta and Landau (2005) and Lakusta et al. (2007).
Why, then, is a binary-choice task like similarity judgments ill-equipped to detect lin-
guistic relativity effects? Because if participants are biased by universal principles of event 
cognition to prefer the same-Path over the same-Manner alternate, any hypothetical lan-
guage-specific cognitive bias is likely to be overridden by these principles. A task like sim-
ilarity judgments, in this regard, is not designed to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis 
but, rather, linguistic determinism, a proposal which has long been abandoned in cognitive 
science.
Similarity Ratings: A Promising New Direction
Similarity ratings belong to the same family as similarity judgments; however, while in the 
latter participants have only a binary choice, in the former they can choose among several 
points on a graded rating scale, which enables them to give a much more precise similarity 
measure.
Czechowska and Ewert (2011) is the only study in the domain of Path and Manner of 
motion which, in addition to binary judgments, also used similarity ratings. This study, as 
mentioned in “Linguistic Relativity in the Motion Domain” section, reports having found 
positive evidence for linguistic relativity; this finding, however, should be treated with 
extreme caution. Not only did Czechowska and Ewert (2011) not employ a verbal inter-
ference manipulation, but the stimuli used consisted of pictures instead of videos, which 
renders its results and conclusions questionable. To test the linguistic relativity hypothesis 
in the motion domain, participants must attend to real motion events and not, as Cardini 
(2010) notes, infer motion from static images.
In the previous section, it was argued that if there were subtle differences across lan-
guage groups in the way motion events are conceptualised, binary judgements would 
likely  not be able to capture this variation. Would similarity ratings do any better? If 
instead of asking participants to select one alternate on the basis of similarity to the target, 
they were instructed to assign a similarity rating to [target + alternate 1] as well as one to 
[target + alternate 2] using a Likert scale, two types of information would be made avail-
able: (1) which of the two target-alternate combinations received, on average, the higher 
rating, and (2) the difference between the two target-alternate combinations’ mean ratings. 
(1) should reveal which dimension of motion, Path or Manner, was conceptualised as being 
the more salient in that particular triad, a result which should be language-independent. 
(2), in turn, should tell us how much more salient one dimension was deemed to be in 
relation to the other across language groups –that is, whether  or not linguistic relativity 
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effects were observed. Undoubtedly, the subtler the linguistic relativity effects, the smaller 
the chances of bringing them to the surface. What is clear is that a similarity rating task has 
at least a good chance of finding differences in motion conceptualisation across different 
language groups. For this reason, similarity ratings (and not binary judgments) were used 
in the present study.
Summary
None of the studies claiming to find linguistic relativity effects have employed a verbal 
interference manipulation; it  is therefore likely that, in these studies, performance was 
mediated by language. Moreover, in the studies where a verbal interference task was 
included, linguistic relativity effects were not observed (e.g. Gennari et al. 2002 and Car-
dini 2010), which suggests that the habitual use of language does not have an enduring 
effect on non-verbal cognition. The latter studies, however, relied on experimental meth-
ods (i.e. binary judgments and memory recognition) which, had linguistic relativity effects 
existed, would have likely failed to detect them. As a result, neither the ‘positive’ nor the 
‘negative’ evidence for linguistic relativity in the domain of motion conceptualisation can 
be regarded as conclusive.
The Present Study
The present study explores whether different lexicalisation patterns in English and Spanish 
predict how speakers of these languages perform in a non-verbal experiment. The over-
arching research question that guided this investigation is as follows: given the fact that 
English speakers indicate Manner information with greater frequency than Spanish speak-
ers when talking about bounded motion events, is it the case that Manner is less cognitively 
salient for Spanish than for English speakers?
In order to answer this question, two experiments were conducted: first, a similarity rat-
ing task, in which participants rated sequences of two motion events on the basis of how 
similar to each other these events were perceived to be; second, a verbal elicitation task, in 
which participants were asked to verbally describe the stimulus material used in the rating 
task. The experiments were carried out in this order for a reason: if participants had been 
asked to describe the target items first, this initial coding could have had an influence on 
how participants behaved in the subsequent similarity rating task, thus contaminating what 
was supposed to be a non-verbal experiment. The similarity rating task, therefore, preceded 
the verbal elicitation task.
This study shares the same rationale as previous studies aimed at testing the linguis-
tic relativity hypothesis in the motion domain. The rating task was designed to explore 
whether English and Spanish speakers follow language-congruent patterns when asked to 
make similarity judgments of sequences of bounded motion events. The verbal elicitation 
task, in turn, was a validation test; that is, it was aimed at showing that the motion events 
used in the rating task reproduced Talmy’s (1985) typology when participants were asked 
to describe them verbally. Thus, if significant cross-group differences were observed to 
occur in the similarity rating task, these differences could then be related to participants’ 
verbal performance in the elicitation task. However, if no significant cross-group differ-
ences were revealed by the similarity rating task, but differences in verbal performance 
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emerged in the elicitation task, then it could be concluded that linguistic structure is not 
a predictor of non-verbal behaviour. The results obtained in this study are in keeping with 
this latter scenario.
Experiment I
Experiment I was designed by paying special attention to the lessons learned from previous 
attempts to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis. First, the classic binary judgment task 
was replaced by similarity ratings; participants viewed sequences of two motion events and 
were asked to rate them using a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from [0] at the lowest simi-
larity point to [6] at the highest. Second, the task was combined with a verbal interference 
manipulation, to make sure that the results obtained, if positive, could be confidently inter-
preted as linguistic relativity effects. Finally, unlike previous studies, a control condition 
was included so that cross-group differences, if found, could be uncontroversially explained 
by reference to the typological contrast observed between the two languages studied.
Method
Participants
18 monolingual speakers of English and 18 monolingual speakers of Spanish were tested. 2 
participants per group had to be discarded for either failing to pass the attentional controls 
(see “Non-critical Stimuli” section) or giving highly inconsistent responses. For the pur-
pose of this study, a monolingual speaker was defined as one who spoke fluently only their 
native tongue and had never lived for longer than 6 months in a country where a different 
language from their mother tongue was spoken.
The English speakers were all students at the University of Cambridge (mean age = 23) 
and were tested in a quiet room provided by the university. The Spanish-speaking group, 
in turn, were composed of tertiary-level students and graduates in full-time employment 
residing in Buenos Aires, Argentina (mean age = 25.5), and were tested in similar condi-
tions to the English speakers.
Materials
Stimuli 30 experimental items (or dyads) were used, each of them consisting of a sequence 
of two video clips, i.e.: a model and an alternate clip. The clips, 45 in total, were filmed 
with a DSC-H20 Sony digital video camera and showed a person or an object performing a 
motion event in a real-life environment. The average duration of a clip was of 3.5 s. Though 
some clips appeared in more than one dyad, each dyad displayed a distinct combination of 
clips.
Critical Stimuli 46.6% of the trials used critical stimuli, which consisted of 7 differ-
ent-Manner (DM) and 7 different-Path (DP) items. Every dyad in the DM condition had a 
‘sister’ in the DP condition. A set of sister dyads, as illustrated in Fig. 1, shared the same 
model clip yet differed in terms of the alternate clip: whereas in the DM dyad the alternate 
clip was the same as the model save for the fact that the Figure’s Manner changed, in the 
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DP dyad the alternate clip was the same as the model except for the fact that the Figure’s 
Path changed.
The motion events in the DM and DP conditions were bounded and, therefore, were 
expected to trigger a typological contrast between English and Spanish (see “The Typol-
ogy of Motion Expressions: The Case of English Versus Spanish” section). The clips 
displayed a total of 7 Manners (i.e. run, walk, step, jump, climb, bounce, roll), 6 Paths 
(i.e. into, out [of], down, up, onto, off), 2 Figures (i.e. man, ball) and 5 Ground objects 
(i.e. house, plastic box, stairs, chair, cardboard box). The DM and DP items used are 
listed in Table 1.
Non-critical Stimuli 53.3% of the trials used non-critical stimuli, which consisted of 7 
controls (which also served as distractors), 7 ‘regulators’ and 2 attentional controls. Just 
like the DM and DP conditions, the control/distractor (CD) condition was composed of 
dyads in which the alternate clip differed from the model clip; however, this condition was 
distinct in two respects. First, the events depicted in each clip were not bounded and, there-
fore, did not trigger a typological contrast between English and Spanish. Additionally, in 
these items, the dimension which underwent change was not motion-related (see Fig. 2). A 
list with the CD items used is provided in “Appendix 1”, Table 2.
The regulators were designed with the intention of minimising idiosyncratic uses 
of the scale. The model and alternate clips present in each regulator differed from one 
another in more than one dimension and, therefore, were visibly less similar than the 
dyads in the other conditions. Some of the regulators differed on two dimensions (e.g. 
Path and Ground underwent change whereas Manner and Figure remained the same) 
Fig. 1  A set of sister dyads, the first from the different-Manner (DM) condition and the second from the 
different-Path (DP)
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Table 1  Items in the DM and DP conditions
No. Model clip Alternate clip Ground object
DM condition
1 runs into walks into house
entra (corriendo) entra (caminando)
2 walks out runs out
sale (caminando) sale (corriendo)
3 steps into jumps into plastic box
entra (caminando) entra (de un salto)
4 runs down walks down stairs
baja (corriendo) baja (caminando)
5 walks up runs up
sube (caminando) sube (corriendo)
6 jumps onto climbs onto chair
sube (de un salto) sube (trepando)
7 bounces into rolls into cardboard box
entra (picando) entra (rodando)
DP condition
1 walks out walks into house
sale (caminando) entra (caminando)
2 runs into runs out
entra (corriendo) sale (corriendo)
3 steps out of steps into plastic box
sale (caminando) entra (caminando)
4 walks up walks down stairs
sube (caminando) baja (caminando)
5 runs down runs up
baja (corriendo) sube (corriendo)
6 climbs off climbs onto chair
baja (agarrándose) sube (trepando)
7 rolls out of rolls into cardboard box
sale (rodando) entra (rodando)
Fig. 2  An experimental item from the CD condition
15Journal of Psycholinguistic Research (2020) 49:1–29 
1 3
and some on three (e.g. Path, Manner and Ground underwent change whereas only the 
Figure remained the same); an example is provided in Fig. 3.
By including these items among the stimulus material, an objective rating criterion was 
implicitly established: a dyad in which model and alternate differed on two or three dimen-
sions should be given a lower similarity rating than a dyad in which only one dimension 
underwent change. Thus, the scope of individual variation was reduced (but not nullified): 
a regulator was expected to be rated somewhere between [0] and [2], whereas a DM, DP or 
CD item between [3] and [5]. A list with all the regulators used is provided in “Appendix 
1”, Table 3.
A rating of [6] meant ‘completely similar’ and was expected to be assigned only to the 
attentional controls. The purpose of these items, which consisted of two identical clips, 
was to make sure that participants were actually paying attention and not giving random 
responses. Participants who rated attentional controls with a number lower than [5] were 
discarded. An example of attentional control is given in Fig. 4.
Shadowing Task The shadowing or verbal interference task consisted of a random sequence 
of 20 CVC nonsense syllables, separated from each other by 2-second blank intervals. Par-
ticipants listened to the nonsense syllables via a pair of Sony MDR570LPB headphones and 
repeated them back whilst performing the similarity rating task. Two versions of the same 
shadowing task were created, one compatible with the English sound system and the other 
Fig. 3  A regulator item
Fig. 4  An attentional control
16 Journal of Psycholinguistic Research (2020) 49:1–29
1 3
with the Spanish. The English nonsense syllables were taken from Boothroyd and Nittrouer 
(1988) whereas the Spanish ones were especially designed for this experiment. All the non-
sense syllables were recorded by the experimenter using a Zoom H4n Handy Recorder.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room using Microsoft Office Power Point 2013 
on a Samsung Series 5 portable PC laptop. Subjects were tested in their native language 
and given a monetary reward for their participation. The experiment took 6 min and 37 s to 
be completed and included a short training task at the beginning.
Subjects sat opposite a laptop computer screen displaying a 7-point Likert scale. Partici-
pants were told that the task involved rating sequences of two video clips on the basis of 
how similar to one another these two clips were perceived to be. They were instructed to do 
this as soon as the second clip in the sequence finished playing.5
As to the scale, participants were told that similarity increased from left to right, as 
the numbers increased. They were instructed that a rating of [0] was appropriate for those 
sequences in which the clips played were completely different from one another whereas 
a rating of [6] was meant for those which were completely similar or identical. In order 
to make it clear what completely different and completely similar meant in the context of 
the experiment, an example of a [0] and a [6] item (a regulator and an attentional control 
respectively) was shown to the participants prior to starting the task (see Fig. 5). The aim 
of this was to calibrate participants to the scale.
The procedure was simple. The experimenter initiated the verbal interference manipu-
lation first; once the subject had repeated nonsense syllables for 10 s, the rating task was 
started. Participants always saw two clips played in sequence and, subsequently, a rating 
scale, which stayed on the screen for only 3.5 s. Participants, who kept repeating nonsense 
syllables until the end of the task, rated the sequences of clips by pointing to the scale with 
a rubber pen. Each rating given was recorded by the experimenter on an answer sheet.
Since some clips featured in more than one dyad, it was reasonable to expect priming 
effects. For instance, the second time that participants saw the clip a man walks into the 
house, which was present in both DM-1 and DP-1 (see Table 1), their previous experience 
with it could have exerted an influence on the way in which this clip was conceptualised. 
Whether this could have had an undesirable effect on the actual rating task is uncertain. To 
control for this eventuality, items were presented in two different orders. To one half of the 
participants, items were presented according to order A, whereas order B, which was order 
A reversed, was used with the other half of the participants. Had priming effects of the sort 
described above existed, this technique would have numerically cancelled them.
5 Serial presentation of the video clips, as in Gennari et al. (2002), was preferred over simultaneous presen-
tation, as in Cardini (2010). The latter mode of stimulus presentation is, I believe, highly unnaturalistic, as 
participants are required to process two alternate clips (effectively, two ‘possible worlds’) at the same time 
and during an extremely short time frame. This raises concerns as to whether participants are even capable 
of accomplishing such a task accurately and whether the response pattern would stay the same if the experi-
mental design allowed for a more focused examination of the stimuli.
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Task‑Specific Prediction
The linguistic relativity hypothesis in the domain of motion predicts that the dimension of 
Manner should be less cognitively salient for Spanish than for English speakers, as the former 
do not habitually specify Manner information when talking about bounded motion events. 
Conversely, since Path information must be obligatorily specified in both English and Span-
ish, there are no reasons, at least as far as the linguistic relativity hypothesis is concerned, to 
expect significant differences in Path conceptualisation between the two groups tested.
Thus,  according to this hypothesis, the Spanish speakers should, on average, give 
the  DM (different-Manner) items a higher similarity rating than the English speakers 
whereas the DP (different-Path) items should not trigger cross-group differences. However, 
as the two groups might exhibit different baseline response biases, the most accurate pre-
diction that can be articulated is as follows: the difference between the Spanish speakers’ 
DM and DP rating means should be significantly larger than the difference between the 
English speakers’ DM and DP rating means.
Results and Discussion
On average, the English speakers rated both DM and DP items higher on the scale than 
the Spanish speakers, i.e.:  MDM = 4.34 (English) versus  MDM = 3.76 (Spanish);  MDP = 3.75 
(English) versus  MDP = 3.04 (Spanish) (see Fig.  6). To test the task’s prediction, a 2 × 2 
Fig. 5  Attentional control (AC) and regulator (RG) used to calibrate participants to the scale’s extremes
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mixed ANOVA with group (English vs. Spanish) as a between-subjects factor and condi-
tion (DM, DP) as a within-subjects factor was run. The test revealed a main effect of group 
(F (1, 30) = 8.345, p < 0.05); however, there was no significant interaction between group 
and condition (F (1, 30) = 0.593, p > 0.05, ηp2 = 0.019). The lack of interaction indicates that 
the difference between the Spanish speakers’ DM and DP rating means was not signifi-
cantly larger than the difference between the English speakers’ DM and DP rating means. 
This result does not support the prediction made in “Task-Specific Prediction” section.
The question that remains to be answered is why the mean ratings of the two groups tested 
significantly differed in both the DM and DP conditions. The most likely explanation is that 
the English and Spanish speakers had different rating baselines. In order to discard, however, 
the possibility of language having had any influence on participants’ ratings, an ANOVA 
test with the mean rating for the CD (control/distractor) condition as dependant variable 
and group (English vs. Spanish) as a between-subjects factor was run. The CD condition, as 
explained in “Non-critical Stimuli” section, was specifically designed not to trigger cross-
group variation; the ANOVA test, however, revealed that the English speakers rated CD items 
higher on the scale than the Spanish speakers and that this difference was statistically signifi-
cant (F (1, 30) = 8.892, p < 0.05) (see Fig. 7). Since the same effect of group observed in the 
DM and DP conditions also surfaced in the CD condition, this effect cannot be explained by 
evoking Talmy’s (1985) typological contrast between V- and S-languages.
In order to determine whether there were still significant differences between groups 
once the rating means for the DM and DP conditions were adjusted for the difference found 
in the CD condition, two ANCOVA tests were conducted: one with the mean rating for 
the DM condition as dependant variable and the other with the mean rating for the DP 
condition; in both cases, the mean rating for the CD (control) condition was used as co-
variant and group was the between-subjects factor. After the adjustment, the effect of group 
reported above completely disappeared  (FDM (1, 29) = 2.237, p > 0.05;  FDP (1, 29) = 1.113, 
p > 0.05). The results obtained in this experiment, therefore, do not corroborate the linguis-
tic relativity hypothesis.
In “When is a Non-verbal Task Non-verbal?” section, the issue of whether a verbal 
interference task has the capacity to interfere with non-verbal cognitive processes was 
raised. A first possibility is that it suppresses only the language faculty, thus preventing 
Fig. 6  Mean ratings with Standard Error Bars for the DM and DP conditions
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participants from recruiting linguistic codes during the task. If this is what in fact 
occurs, linguistic relativity effects, had they existed, should not have passed undetected. 
The other possibility is that the verbal interference interferes with other cognitive pro-
cesses (in addition those specific to language) and thus bleaches any trace of linguistic 
relativity. The results obtained in the present study offer support for the former scenario.
As discussed in “Similarity Judgment Tasks (Testing Determinism?)” section, the 
Path dimension seems to override the Manner dimension in the cognitive appreciation 
of human motion as a general rule (cf. Pourcel 2004, 2005). Studies such as Gennari 
et al. (2002) and Cardini (2010), which used animated motion events with human Fig-
ures, provide good evidence for this i.e.: participants exhibited a preference for choos-
ing same-Path (or different-Manner) over same-Manner (or different-Path) alternates 
regardless of their linguistic background.
Pourcel (2004, 2005) has speculated that the tendency to prioritise Path (which in telic 
motion events typically codes the very goal of motion) over Manner may be related to 
a number of properties present in the event being perceived, including whether the Figure 
performing the motion is an animate or inanimate entity. She (2005: 247) conjectures, for 
example, that ‘inanimates, such as objects, may not be perceived as undergoing or initiat-
ing intentioned motion with purposeful PATH ENDPOINTS’. According to Pourcel (2004, 
2005), this would predict that behavioural tasks in which an inanimate Figure is used may 
fail to reproduce the Path salience observed in studies like Gennari et al. (2002) and Car-
dini (2010). The evidence obtained in Zlatev et al. (2010: ch5, study 1) seems to support 
this prediction: in a similarity judgment task whose stimuli was computer-generated and 
displayed a tomato as Figure, participants’ choices did not exhibit a Path bias.
In accord with these patterns, in the present experiment participants conceptualised 
motion events differently according to whether the moving Figure was an animate or an 
inanimate entity. When the events presented involved human motion, all participants, 
regardless of their linguistic background, rated DP items, on average, lower on the scale 
than DM items: for the English group,  MDP = 3.72 versus  MDM = 4.42; for the Span-
ish group,  MDP = 3.03 versus  MDM = 3.86. A 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
within-subjects main effect of condition (F(1, 30) = 89.47, p < 0.05) as well as a sig-
nificant between-subjects main effect of group (F(1, 30) = 8.03, p < 0.05). Overall, this 
Fig. 7  Mean ratings with Standard Error Bars for the DM, DP and CD conditions
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indicates that, in the case of dyads involving human motion, Path changes were cogni-
tively more salient than Manner changes (see Fig. 8).
Among the stimuli used, however, two experimental items displayed a ball as Figure (i.e. 
DM-7 & DP-7, Table 1).6 Notably, participants did not exhibit a Path bias when rating these 
items (see Fig.  9): for the English group,  MDP = 3.94 versus  MDM = 3.88; for the Spanish 
group,  MDP = 3.13 versus  MDM = 3.13. A 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA showed a significant between-
subjects main effect of group (F(1, 30) = 6.27, p < 0.05); this time, however, no within-subjects 
condition effect was detected (F(1, 30) = 0.02, p > 0.05). The fact that participants’ similarity 
judgments were sensitive to the Figure’s animacy provides evidence that the verbal interfer-
ence manipulation used did not interfere with what are likely to be universal mechanisms of 
event conceptualisation. Furthermore, participants were able to identify those dyads in which 
Fig. 8  Mean ratings with Standard Error Bars for the DM and DP items (human motion)
Fig. 9  Mean ratings with Standard Error Bars for the DM and DP items (object motion)
6 Note that no motion-causing agent was visible in these experimental items.
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the two clips displayed were identical (attentional controls) and rate them accordingly. Like-
wise, those dyads in which the clips were very different from each other (regulators) were 
consistently given low ratings (see Fig. 10). 
Previous studies in motion conceptualisation (Gennari et  al. 2002; Cardini 2010) and 
inspection (Trueswell and Papafragou 2010) which adopted a dual-task paradigm provided no 
evidence of whether the shadowing task used interfered with general cognitive mechanisms 
of event perception and conceptualisation. In these studies, it is therefore unclear why lin-
guistic relativity effects do not arise: is it because the normal functioning of the cognitive sys-
tem is being disrupted by the interference task or is it simply because the hypothesised effects 
do not exist? The results obtained here suggest that non-verbal cognitive processes (at least 
those involved in motion conceptualisation) are unaffected by the shadowing task. This offers 
support to the view that the dual-task paradigm (non-verbal task + shadowing task) is a valid 
method to test the linguistic relativity hypothesis.
Experiment II
Experiment II consisted of a verbal elicitation task, and was designed to determine whether 
the stimulus material used in Experiment I, when verbally described, triggered the typological 
contrast between English and Spanish established in Talmy (1985).
Method
Participants
The participants tested were the same as in Experiment I. Participants completed Experiment I 
first and only subsequently were engaged in the present task.
Fig. 10  Mean ratings with Standard Error Bars for attentional controls (AC) and regulators (RG)
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Materials
The video clips used in the DM (different-Manner) and DP (different-Path) conditions (Exper-
iment I) were also used in this task. In addition, 8 filler clips were included, which were ran-
domly picked from Experiment I’s regulators and CD (control/distractor) items.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would watch a series of video clips but, unlike in the pre-
vious task, the clips would be presented one by one as opposed to paired in dyads. After each 
clip reached completion, participants were asked to tell the experimenter in their respective 
native languages what had happened (i.e. English: what’s happened in the clip?, Spanish: Qué 
ha sucedido en el video?). Participants’ responses were recorded using a Zoom H4n Handy 
Recorder and subsequently transcribed for analysis. The order of presentation of the stimuli 
was the same for all participants.
Results and Discussion
Like in Gennari et  al. (2002), and in accord with  Talmy’s (1985) typology, the results 
obtained indicate that the English and Spanish speakers differed in terms of the frequency 
with which Manner information was supplied: whereas the English speakers lexicalised 
Manner information in 100% of their utterances, the Spanish speakers gave such information 
in 71.25% of theirs (see Fig. 11). An ANOVA test on the proportion of cases where Manner 
was specified with group (English vs. Spanish) as a between-subjects factor confirmed that 
there was a significant main effect of group (F (1, 30) = 33.113, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.52).
The English-speaking participants also differed from the Spanish in terms of where in 
the sentence Manner and Path were coded. Whereas the English speakers coded Manner 
information in the main verb in 100% of their utterances, the Spanish speakers did so only in 
Fig. 11  Percentage of utterances 
with Manner information with 
Standard Error Bars (%)
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16.98% of theirs (see Fig. 12). The latter group, as expected, preferred to express Path in the 
main verb (e.g. subir ‘ascend’, entrar ‘enter’) and supplied Manner information in the form 
of an optional gerund or adverbial complement at the end of the sentence (e.g. caminando 
‘walking’, rápidamente ‘quickly’). An ANOVA on the proportion of cases where Manner 
was coded in the main verb with group (English vs. Spanish) as a between-subjects factor 
showed a significant main effect of group (F (1, 30) = 2410.728, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.99).7 
Though the results confirm only what is already well-established in the literature, the 
fact that the expected linguistic differences between the English and Spanish speakers sur-
faced so clearly confirms the strength of the stimuli design and indicates that the concep-
tualisation of motion events does not follow language-congruent patterns8: indeed, though 
the Spanish speakers supplied Manner information less frequently than the English speak-
ers when asked to describe a series of bounded motion events, the two groups of partic-
ipants, when asked to make similarity judgements of  paired configurations of the same 
events, showed equal sensitivity to the dimension of Manner.
General Discussion
At the outset of this article, two different views on the relationship between language and 
thought were introduced. According to the linguistic relativity position, linguistic represen-
tations are able to exert an enduring influence upon those cognitive processes required to 
segment and conceptually represent events. By contrast, according to the universalist posi-
tion, non-verbal cognitive processes are impervious to linguistic influence; on this view, all 
humans share the same conceptual structure, but possess different rules mapping concep-
tual components onto lexical and syntactic frames. In the present study, by comparing non-
verbal performance in a similarity rating task to linguistic performance in an elicitation 
task, I have found evidence that supports the universalist position.
Fig. 12  Percentage of utterances 
with Manner coded in main verb 
with Standard Error Bars
7 Interrater reliability measures were taken to make sure that the coding of the verbal elicitations was accu-
rate. Interrater reliability was calculated as percent agreement between two data collectors, as in McHugh 
(2012), on the basis of 25% of the dataset. The percent agreement score for Manner info was 92.65%, while 
the one for Manner coded in main verb was 90.12%.
8 Other studies have also found significant linguistic differences across language groups, yet weaker ones 
(cf. Gennari et al. 2002; Papafragou et al. 2008; Cardini 2010).
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It could be argued that linguistic relativity effects were not found because the typologi-
cal contrast between the two languages studied is too tightly circumscribed, being observed 
only in telic motion expressions. In addition, as discussed in “The Typology of Motion 
Expressions: The Case of English versus Spanish” section, these two languages can exhibit 
both V- and S-language behaviour, which means that speakers are not forced to use one or 
other lexicalisation strategy. Is the typological contrast between English and Spanish strong 
enough so as to render relativity effects? This question is difficult to answer because, so 
far, and as far as I am aware, no compelling evidence of enduring effects of language on 
non-verbal cognition has been presented, neither in the domain of motion nor in any other 
domain.9
Lucy (2010), for example, maintains that lexico-grammatical patterns which are used 
ubiquitously are likely to have the greatest impact on thought. Much of his work has in fact 
been devoted to showing that speakers of languages with obligatory grammatical number 
marking and count-mass noun distinction (e.g. English) are more likely to base their simi-
larity judgements of objects on shape than speakers of non-plural marking classifier lan-
guages (e.g. Yucatec) who tend to base their judgments on substance properties. It remains 
unclear, however, whether the pervasiveness and systematicity of a given lexico-grammat-
ical pattern is correlated to the probability of finding linguistic relativity effects. Though it 
is true that Lucy (Lucy 1992a; Lucy and Gaskins 2001, 2003) reported language-specific 
effects on object categorisation, these studies do not constitute conclusive evidence for lin-
guistic relativity, the reason for this being simple: English and Yucatec speakers did not 
perform under verbal interference conditions.
A more likely explanation for why linguistic relativity effects have not been found in the 
present study (in spite of having carefully designed Experiment I to increase the likelihood 
of finding them) is that language may exert only a transient influence on thought. This 
study is in fact a contribution to the emerging picture that language effects on non-verbal 
performance do not surface when participants are placed under conditions of verbal inter-
ference, which indicates that language is unlikely to have an enduring effect on non-verbal 
cognition.
Conclusions
This article examined whether the dimension of Manner is less cognitively salient for 
Spanish than for English speakers, a question motivated by the observation that these two 
languages typically differ in terms of the frequency with which Manner information is 
supplied in telic motion expressions. To address this question, English and Spanish native 
speakers’ performance in a dual-task experiment (similarity ratings + shadowing task) was 
compared to their linguistic performance in a verbal elicitation task. Though the analysis 
of the non-verbal data exposed a main effect of group, this effect was shown not to be caus-
ally related to the cross-group differences revealed by the verbal elicitation task. Evidence 
9 When I say ‘compelling evidence’, what I mean is evidence coming from a dual-task paradigm in which 
participants performed under conditions of verbal interference. Phillips & Boroditsky (2003), which looked 
at object conceptualisation in German vs. Spanish, is the only study that, to my knowledge, has found cross-
group differences under conditions of verbal interference. However, the researchers themselves (2003: 932) 
call into question the results obtained: ‘[p]erhaps the shadowing task simply didn’t disable all the aspects of 
language that could have been covertly recruited for the task? Perhaps some different, more complex verbal 
interference task would have changed the results’.
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was also provided that shadowing tasks such as the one used in this study do not seem to 
interfere with the cognitive mechanisms involved in event conceptualisation, offering sup-
port to the view that the dual-task paradigm is a valid method to test the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis in the motion domain.
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Appendix 1
See Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2  Items in the control/distractor (CD) condition
No. Model clip Alternate clip
1 jumps (a man with scarf) jumps
salta (un hombre con bufanda) salta
2 hits the wall (a man with hat) hits the wall
golpea la pared (un hombre con sombrero) golpea la pared
3 rotates rotates (with a box)
rota rota (con una caja)
4 claps claps (with a box on his head)
aplaude aplaude (con una caja en la cabeza)
5 runs around bush (a man with a different coat) runs around bush
corre alrededor del árbol (un hombre con otro saco) corre alrededor del árbol
6 hugs a tree (a man with a different jacket) hugs a tree
abraza el árbol (un hombre con otra campera) abraza el árbol
7 runs on the spot (a man with umbrella) runs on the spot
corre en el lugar (un hombre con paraguas) corre en el lugar
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Appendix 2
In this appendix, the verbal descriptions of 3 critical items (cf. “Critical Stimuli” section) pro-
duced by three randomly chosen participants from each language group are provided. Regard-
ing the elicitations in Spanish, the criterion to count a token as Manner was that the token 
could clearly answer the question: In which Manner did the Figure move? For instance, the 
Prepositional Phrase por el piso ‘against/along the floor’ was counted as Manner as it clearly 
communicates the fact that the ball roll but did not bounce when travelling in space from the 
outside to the inside of the box. In the examples below, Manner tokens are underlined, Path 
tokens appear in CAPITALS, and the analysis of the elicitations is given in grey.
English speakers 
1.  Ball rolls INTO the box
Manner (main verb) + Path (satellite)
2.  Man is jogging OUT OF a doorway
Manner (main verb) + Path (satellite)
3.  A man runs UP some steps
Manner (main verb) + Path (satellite)  
Spanish speakers 
1.   Una    pelota    ENTRANDO en    una    caja      por                   el       piso
‘A        ball       entering           in     a        box      against/along    the    floor’
      Path (main verb) + Manner (prepositional phrase) 
2.   Una    persona    SALIENDO de         una     casa           trotando
‘A       person       exiting           from      a         house         jogging’
Path (main verb) + Manner (gerund) 
3.   Una     persona  SUBIENDO  unas     escaleras   en    una    plaza 
‘A  person     ascending    some    stairs          in     a        park’
Path (main verb) + Manner (Ø)
Table 3  Regulators used in 
Experiment I No. Model clip Alternate clip
1 Skips across the road Skips up to the tree
2 Steps out of the box Jumps down from chair
3 Runs on the spot Runs up to the wall
4 Skips away from tree Runs up to the wall
5 Walks across the road Walks around the box
6 Runs up to the wall Jumps from table
7 Walks along the street Waves to camera
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